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abstract  The paper argues that something is art only if (i) it belongs to a 
special kind of internal history and (ii) needs to be understood and appreci­
ated in the light of such history. This goes against both the traditional view 
that art has a timeless, ahistorical essence and the historicist view that there 
can be no ahistorical perspective for understanding art. The paper draws on 
Hegel’s view that art needs to be understood through its history, but rejects 
the idea that the history of art has an end in the double sense of a goal and an 
end point. It also rejects Arthur Danto’s Hegel­inspired claim that the ahistori­
cal essence of art is revealed at the end of its history and opens the door to a 
natural alliance between philosophers of art and art historians.
keywords  History of art, Hegel, philosophy of art
Art is in a pretty humdrum sense the sort of thing that necessarily has a 
history. But from this alone it does not follow that art is essentially his-
torical in the sense that understanding what art is would essentially turn 
on its historical character. Science and technology also necessarily have 
a history, but most of us would say that they are not essentially histori-
cal. One can say what science and technology are as human enterprises 
with no substantial reference to their history. Religion is an interesting 
case, as those looking at religion from the inside would, I think, say that 
it is essentially ahistorical, while those looking at it from the outside are 
likely to see it in historical terms. 
In aesthetics there is a tradition, running from Plato and Aristotle 
through Kant to analytical aesthetics, which seeks to identify a timeless 
and universal nature or essence of art. Then there is the tradition, clus-
tered around Hegel, which seeks to explain the nature or essence of art 
through or against its history. I shall argue that the truth lies in between. 
The history of aesthetics is littered with failed attempts to define art 
ahistorically. On the other hand, the historicist claim that the very idea 
of any kind of suprahistorical perspective on art makes no sense reduces 
aesthetics to cultural philosophy musing on the diversity of different 
ages and cultures, or speculating on what options there may be open to 
contemporary or future art. Hegel was not a historicist in this sense.2 But 
neither was he an ahistorical universalist in the manner of Kant, whose 
account of art makes no substantive reference to history.3 Hegel says that 
by his time art has reached the stage of historical development where it 
“invites us to intellectual consideration […] for knowing scientifically4 
Art and its History
49
what art is.”5 It is possible to read this as saying that history is for Hegel 
like the ladder of philosophy for Wittgenstein and can be thrown away 
once you have climbed to the top of it.6 This is the interpretation the 
greatest contemporary champion of Hegel’s aesthetics, Arthur Danto, 
puts on Hegel. Danto argues that art reveals its own nature or essence at 
the end of its history and is thereby liberated from that history. I think 
this is not the best way of understanding Hegel. As I read Hegel, he is not 
saying that the supposed end of (the history of) art transforms art into 
something essentially ahistorical, which is the crux of Danto’s strategy 
for rescuing art from Hegel’s conclusion that art had become a spent cul-
tural force. I shall argue that it is the notion of an end of history that mis-
leads both Hegel and Danto. If we can explain the historicity of art with 
no reference to ends of history, as I am convinced we can, then we need 
not accept Hegel’s conclusion that art is a thing of the past, nor Danto’s 
quixotic claim that art has turned into philosophy. Hegel is unduly pes-
simistic, while the ahistorical essence that Danto ascribed to art makes 
sense only against the history of art.
Hegel and Danto think that we can come to understand the essence of 
art through understanding its history. In my view we can come to under-
stand the historicity of art through coming to understand the history of 
art. This may sound like a trivial and circular enterprise, but I hope to 
show that dovetailing history and historicity is not a circular undertak-
ing if, in addition to philosophical reflection, it assigns a proper role for 
historical discovery. 
I believe a firmer grasp of the historicity of art will also enable aes-
thetics to see more clearly what common ground it may have with the 
scholar ly study of art, while at the same time taking distance to art theory, 
at least in its more historicist reaches. As I see it, the future of aesthetics 
as an independent field of inquiry largely depends on its independence 
in relation to the scholarly study of art on the one hand and to art theory 
on the other hand.7 That is too large a question, though, to be properly 
tackled here and I shall not go into it, save a few general remarks towards 
the end of this paper. 
The historical particularity of art
The observation that, like such other human enterprises as science, tech-
nology and religion (looked at from the outside),8 art necessarily has a 
history obviously does not entail that art necessarily has the history – or 
rather, histories – it has. Hegel thought that in addition to necessarily 
having a history, art also necessarily had the type of history it had, but 
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that is a different thing. Hegel thought that art could, as it were, come to 
the world only through a certain type of historical and cultural develop-
ment, but the actual shape and content of that history were not prede-
termined by some Platonic idea of art nor der Geist, the Spirit, to whose 
developmental history art belongs in Hegel’s philosophy. The direction 
is given at the outset, but the actual historical development is contingent 
for the simple and sound reason that the actual circumstances of history 
and culture are always contingent. On no reasonable reading can Hegel 
be accused (or praised) of historical determinism.9
The idealistic trappings of Hegel’s aesthetics are, as Danto says, 
“[b]izarre [...] in every possible respect.”10 But what is of enduring value 
and interest in Hegel can, as Danto has demonstrated, be re-formulated 
and thought about with no commitment to the underlying idealistic 
metaphysics.11 And it is a worthwhile enterprise, as Hegel shows more in-
sight into the historicity of art than any other major philosopher of art. 
Hegel was well aware that the grand philosophical history of art that 
he delineates in his vast Vorlesungen über die Ästhetic (Lectures on Fine 
Art, as it is known in English12) glosses over countless factual histories 
(Realgeschichten, as Hegel would have called them). In his discussion of 
existing “scientific ways of treating art,” Hegel distinguishes the philo-
sophical enterprise from (art) scholarship (Kunstgelehrsamkeit), which 
has its starting point in the empirical.13 He states in passing the idea that 
continues to dominate art history:
[...] every work of art belongs to its own time, its own people, its own environ-
ment, and depends on particular historical and other ideas and purposes [...]14
Eighty years after the first publication of Hegel’s edited lecture notes, 
Heinrich Wölfflin, one of the founders of modern art history, states the 
guiding principle of the budding branch as a self-evident truth with the 
slogan “Different times give birth to different art.” According to Wölfflin, 
the natural working practice of art history is then “to draw parallels be-
tween periods of culture and periods of style.”15
In Hegel’s view the scholarly study of art that later became known as 
art history is of enduring value, but is at the same time of necessity too 
wedded to the historical particularities of art to be able to establish the 
true nature of art.16 (It is noteworthy that in the philosophical introduc-
tion of Aesthetics Hegel discusses art virtually exclusively in terms of the 
visual arts. Hegel’s influence is evident in the predominance of the visual 
arts in later aesthetics. This would be an interesting topic for historians 
of aesthetics.) Here it may be in order to stress that although Hegel does 
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occasionally speak of the Zeitgeist (the spirit of the time),17 which is com-
monly thought to explain the historical fit between art and culture at 
large, the vague blanket notion has no place in his more rigorous philo-
sophical thinking.18 
Traditional philosophical theories of art, such as Aristotle’s Poetics, 
constitute another approach to the “primarily historical treatment” of 
art. In Hegel’s view, the philosophical shortcoming of these kinds of art 
theories is that “in their generality (Allgemeinheit) they make no progress 
towards establishing the particular (Besonderes).”19 
What Hegel is saying, I think, is that an adequate philosophy of art 
must be able to account for both the concrete historical particularity and 
the universal arthood of the individual works of art. That is a very tall 
order indeed and I doubt that any philosophy of art, including Hegel’s 
own, can rise to meet it. But it should at the very least make us wary of 
the tendency of philosophers of art to illustrate, support and test their 
theories by more or less random citing of works of art torn out of their 
historical context. The thought is presumably that if the theory captures 
the essence of art, then it can be tested against any work, or, as I would 
prefer to say, instance of art.20 However, such testing becomes circular 
or is at the very least theory-laden in a vitiating sense if it recognises in 
the instance only the features it projects into it and ignores others that a 
contextual description could draw out. I doubt that there is any theory or 
definition of art that could not be faulted on this score.
In his customary fashion Hegel purports to find the right approach to 
the “scientific treatment” of art between the extremes of art scholarship 
as the study of the historical particularities of art and the traditional 
philosophy of art as purely theoretical reflection. According to Hegel, 
traditional philosophy of art strives to get to the bottom of the idea of the 
beautiful as such.21 As Hegel thought the core of art was its beauty and 
the only kind of beauty meriting philosophical inquiry was beauty of art, 
establishing the essence of beauty of art would ipso facto give the true 
nature of art. The traditional way of trying to get at the universal essence 
of beauty and art directly past the particulars of art turns the inquiry into 
“abstract metaphysics” which no longer satisfies the “richer philosophi-
cal needs of our contemporary spirit,” Hegel announced in the 1820s.22 
The true philosophical concept of the beautiful (and thereby of art) must 
unite metaphysical universality with the determinateness (Bestimmt-
heit)23 of its real particularity.24 And that will, in Hegel’s view, necessarily 
involve tracing the history of art. Even if we allow that Hegel obviously 
had in mind a philosophical history, as distinct from art scholar ship’s 
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account of historical particularities,25 the task is truly daunting. How-
ever, I believe it is possible to come to grips with the historicity of art 
on roughly Hegelian lines without trying to out-Hegel Hegel. A closer 
look at Hegel’s massive survey of the history of art reveals that the focus 
is not on the actual history, but on concepts that can be used to identify 
the various historical contexts of art. The three “forms” of art (Symbolic, 
Classical and Romantic) are best seen as broad historical stylistic catego-
ries which are then given content through an analysis of the different 
arts and the various expressive devices (e.g. symbol), genres (e.g. satire), 
themes (e.g. chivalry) and so on, characteristic of and emerging in the 
course of this history of styles. The claim made by Hegel’s Aesthetics 
as a whole is that the essential particularity of art can be captured by 
means of that particular historical framework. Now while the general 
idea of understanding works of art in their historical contexts is hardly 
controversial, the claim that there is one right way of determining such 
contexts most certainly is. And the suggestion that the philosopher of 
art is competent to identify that historical framework is bound to strike 
the more sober of us in the profession as a delusion of grandeur. I think 
Hegel is wrong on the point of there existing some one way of determin-
ing the historical particularity of art and I shall argue that the essential 
historicity of art does not require a unique way of determining the his-
torical particularity of the individual work. From that it does not follow 
that all attempts to deal with art historically fall foul of relativism. I shall 
deal with this charge before setting about extricating Hegel’s insights 
from the extravagances of his metaphysics.
Reconciling historical relativism and historical discovery
From the vantage point of our relativist era, it is all too easy to admit that 
art history’s customary historical framework of periods and styles is not a 
brute fact waiting for discovery out there, but something imposed by the 
art historians on the historical contingences of art. Richard Wollheim’s 
argument for that view is most apposite here as it explicitly focuses on 
art history. Wollheim maintains that art is not essentially historical be-
cause the general concepts of style that art history owes to Hegel are of 
necessity historically relative and cannot therefore capture the essence 
of the individual style of the artist. General style comes in many forms 
of historical and cross-historical26 styles and in applying a general style 
concept to an artist’s work we are, according to Wollheim, “employing 
a kind of shorthand for a set of characteristics which we and those who 
share our outlook find particularly interesting, arresting, innovatory, in 
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a stretch of painting.”27 In other words, general style concepts are histori-
cally relative.
However, at different moments, there will be different historical interests, dif-
ferent contemporary concerns, that will make different characteristics seem 
distinctive of a particular stretch of art and, as this happens, the characteristics 
associated with general style will alter.28 
Wollheim contrasts general style with individual style which is the key 
to the meaning and correct interpretation of an artist’s work. The pivotal 
differences are that the characteristics associated with individual style 
do not alter and that individual style is not shorthand for some set of 
characteristics. Instead of reducing style to a shifting set of characteris-
tics, individual style “causes them [the characteristics] to be as they are.”29 
Wollheim is saying in effect that individual style has its seat in the mind 
of the artist and becomes, in the case of painting, visible through the art-
ist’s work through which she imbues the material medium with mean-
ing. Wollheim maintains that where general style is just a changeable 
way of classifying works of art, individual style has genuine explanatory 
power. Individual style explains how a painting looks the way it does.30 
What Wollheim is saying in so many words is that there are no endur-
ing truths to be discovered in art history delineated in terms of general 
styles, while the immutably fixed characteristics associated with an art-
ist’s individual style are there waiting to be discovered. If that were so, 
art would not be essentially historical and the history of art would be 
reduced to a chronology of (great) artists. (As a historical note, this is the 
view on history of art most readily suggested by Kant’s theory of [fine] 
art as art of genius.31) The only essential history would be the history 
of the development of an artist’s individual style. Let us consider Woll-
heim’s view with the help of a concrete example. Vermeer is one of the 
most enigmatic artists in the history of Western painting. He certainly 
has an individual style and art historians are still struggling to capture 
the key to it. Their tools and methods are by and large the same they em-
ploy in delineating concepts of general style. Even more important, it is 
hard to see how we could capture the individual genius of Vermeer with-
out considering him in and against various frameworks of general style 
– 17th century Dutch interior painting, 17th century Delft painting and 
so on. If absence of narrative content is one element of Vermeer’s style, 
as has been claimed, this surely becomes apparent when we compare 
him to contemporary anecdotal painting, represented by for instance 
Gerard Terborch, or Jan Steen. Wollheim would by no means deny this. 
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He would say that distinctions based on concepts of general style can be 
most relevant to the understanding of the work, but they only constitute 
part of the cognitive stock32 that the viewer brings to her encounter with 
the work and are no more constitutive of the work itself than say specula-
tions on Vermeer’s employment of the camera obscura, or analyses of his 
painting technique in creating his “optical” approach to painting.33 
In the end it is a question of how we want to draw the line between 
what belongs to the work and what belongs to its context, including its 
historical context. Wollheim wants to lift art out of its history in confin-
ing all historical discoveries to the context. As there are no hard facts 
of art directing us to draw the line between work and its context in any 
particular way, Wollheim’s criticism of (broadly Hegelian) general style 
does not constitute a compelling refutation of the idea that art is some-
how essentially historical. I personally find it very hard to imagine how 
one could adequately see, say, Vermeer’s Woman in Blue Reading a Letter 
(Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam) without some consciousness of the histori-
cal particularity of what there is to see in the painting, and then any 
adequate “cognitive stock” bearing on the perception will immediately 
effect a link to the painting’s place in the history of not only Vermeer’s art 
but European art at large. Wollheim by no means denies the importance 
of such linking, but maintains that however much cognitive stock may 
influence the perception of the work, its role is only to enable us to see 
the work correctly.34 
Wollheim wants to exclude history because of the changeability of the 
categories of what he calls general style. However, his claim that the char-
acteristics associated with individual style are fixed immutably makes the 
very notion of individual style rather mysterious. According to Wollheim, 
such style has “psychological reality,” that is, it is in some sense hard-wired 
in the mind (brain) of the artist.35 In that case it must be phenotypically 
a trait that reaches maturity through interaction with the environment, 
which would be in keeping with the customary way of talking of the de-
velopment of the artist’s style. But the idea of such development being 
somehow psychologically destined to reach a phase from which on the 
style manifested in the artist’s work is immutably fixed surely re-echoes 
the Romantic myth of the artist’s genius. The only immutability we have 
to work with is that of the artist’s material body of work. I suspect that is 
the ultimate ground of the alleged immutability of style, but this is not 
the place to delve deeper into such questions. My point is simply that the 
undeniable changeability of the (broadly Hegelian) frameworks of gen-
eral style need not mean that they are arbitrary and only reflect current 
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concerns. It seems to me a misunderstanding of the very nature of history 
to maintain that art can be essentially historical only if there is one true 
way of accounting for the history of art. Multiplicity and revisability do 
not render history relative to the point of excluding historical discovery. 
On the contrary they fire the art historian on to new discoveries.
If Hegel thought his historical scheme was the one true (philosophical) 
history of art, as he apparently did, he was wrong. We can well say that 
art is essentially historical and leave it to the historians with their com-
petence for discovery to give content to historicity in individual cases. 
Aesthetics needs no particular history of art but does need what we could 
call, in a Hegelian spirit, the idea of such a history. In other words, we 
need a non-historical analysis of the historicity of art. I now turn to that 
task.
History without ends
I shall ask two questions:
(i) How does art have its history?
and
(ii)  What type of a history does art have?
Starting with (i), the philosophical fiction of art having just one history 
here amounts to no more than conjecturing that all histories of art are 
similar in the relevant respect. It seems to me a reasonable conjecture. 
I prefer to talk of art having its history to set aside historicism, which 
says with regard to art that art is irreducibly historical and cannot be 
understood from a supra-historical perspective. I think that historicism, 
as practiced for example by Gadamer and Adorno, turns the philosophy 
of art into philosophical history of culture reflecting the shifting view-
points and interests of the historians. In other words, it is irreducibly 
relativist. 
To reiterate, Hegel was not a historicist in this sense. However, I think 
it is an equally mistaken interpretation to take Hegel to say, as Danto 
for instance does, that the nature or essence of art is ahistorical and it 
became possible to establish that essence after art had, “in its highest de-
termination36 come for us a thing of the past.”37 Hegel does undoubtedly 
invite the reading that once the historical development of art has passed 
its high point and art can no longer find a way of reconciling form and 
content, as Hegel thought was happening in Romantic art, it becomes 
possible for the philosopher to take off on the wings of Minerva’s owl 
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and assume an ahistorical point of view on the nature or essence of art.38 
I think the correct interpretation is that we can gain through history 
not an ahistorical but a supra-historical point of view, a point of view in 
which history is built-in. Hegel’s grand scheme of philosophy undoubt-
edly involves the idea of the end of history, as the end point of develop-
ment, but surely from such an end point we would not see things ahis-
torically but rather in their historical fullness. In any case it seems to 
me that it would be better to think of such an end as an idea enabling us 
to think of history in a certain way rather than as something we could 
locate in history. 
Hegel’s pronouncement about art being a thing of the past has un-
fortunately given rise to an awful lot of nonsense about the end of art. 
Arthur Danto did a service to aesthetics when he pointed out that Hegel 
should be understood as talking not about the end of art but about the 
end of the history of art as a certain type of history. Hegel makes it abun-
dantly clear that he does not think that art is about to disappear from the 
world. He certainly thinks that art had become irredeemably inferior art, 
but that is a judgment on art in relation to its end in the sense of the goal 
of its development, not in relation to any absolute historical end point. 
The whole discussion around the alleged end of art tends to suffer from 
equivocation between the two senses of end as goal and end as end point. 
Hegel’s harsh verdict on his contemporary art surely casts doubt on the 
idea of there being an end of art in either of the two senses of a goal and 
an end point of development – unless we are willing to consign all art 
posterior to “the golden age of the later Middle Ages,”39 to the category of 
inferior or failed art. Danto tries to rescue both art and Hegel by claiming 
that in its Hegelian history, art “fulfils its destiny by becoming philosophy 
at last.”40 In Danto’s version of the history of European art this redeeming 
transformation happened as late as in the 1960s, a very long time after 
art had in Hegel’s view become a thing of the past. Be that as it may, I can-
not find any such destiny for art in Hegel. Art does have the same end as 
religion and philosophy, that is, reaching (consciousness of) the absolute 
(idea), but Hegel says very clearly that art and religion cannot, because 
of their very nature of being wedded to sensuous presentation of ideas, 
reach that end and their history comes to an end unfulfilled.41 
Hegel may seem to assert that art has given way to philosophy when 
he says that art no longer invites us “to thinking reflection with the pur-
pose of calling forth anew art but of knowing scientifically what art is.”42 
As I read him, Hegel is saying that art no longer unlocks in us the deepest 
secrets of the human mind in an immediate experience, because our 
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attitude to art has become intellectualised. Instead of surrendering to the 
experience, we judge art aesthetically. Our response to art has become in 
a way philosophical.
On no reasonable reading is Hegel saying that art would have turned 
into its own philosophy, an idea cropping up in the manifestos of con-
ceptual art in particular. From the Hegelian point of view, art could be-
come any kind of philosophy only by ceasing to be art. The theorists of 
conceptual art – and, it seems, Danto as well – want to have their cake 
and eat it. Hegel does suggest that art had become overly intellectual and 
self-conscious, but that does not make it philosophy. Hegel says in no un-
certain terms that art “has still a limit in itself and therefore passes over 
into higher forms of consciousness” and so “art counts no longer as the 
highest mode in which truth fashions an existence for itself.”43 And those 
higher forms of consciousness that come after art are not art reborn but 
religion and philosophy. 
For all his dismissal of Hegel’s metaphysics as bizarre, Danto in effect 
accepts the main elements of Hegel’s theory, but interprets them in a 
manner that is alien to Hegel. Danto maintains that art has an end in the 
sense of a goal in its destiny to become philosophy. As I have pointed out, 
Hegel’s view was that art was by its very nature destined not to turn into 
philosophy but to give way to philosophy.44 It seems to me that the best 
way to naturalize Hegel’s metaphysics is not revamp the history of the 
Spirit, but to abandon it altogether. If we abandon Hegel’s metaphysics 
of the Spirit – as we surely have to if our aim is truth rather than histori-
cal interpretation45 – the history of art Hegel tells is a version of the tradi-
tional view of the development or realisation of certain things as trained 
on perfection.46 Perfection is the end in the sense of a goal. Now pursuit 
of perfection makes sense only if it is a particular perfection, perfection 
in some respect.47 For Hegel perfection of art concerns the artwork’s con-
tent (Inhalt), means of presentation (Darstellungsmittel) and their mutual 
appropriateness or inappropriateness.48 These are very general concepts 
and from them alone it does not follow that there should be one unique 
way of perfectly matching content and presentation, or that the pursuit 
of perfection would be destined to lose direction and disintegrate once 
ideal perfection had been reached. I think there is in art something like 
pursuit of perfection, but the lesson of the history of art is surely that 
there is no unique summit of perfection for which all art strives. But then 
there is no end in the sense of an end point of development inherent in 
art either. Hegel’s romantic admiration of classical Greek culture blinded 
him to the virtues of his contemporary art, which he could only see in 
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terms of an impossible struggle to capture infinity (of Christian teach-
ing) by means of the necessarily finite, sensuous means of presentation 
available to the artist.49 
Art without ends will have a multiplicity of histories with no one 
unique true history among them. However, the various histories can 
be similar in important respects. My position is that while there are no 
immutable facts of art or culture that would as it were steer the hand 
of the historian, our need to understand and value art gives preference 
to certain types of history. This, it seems to me, was Hegel’s enduring 
insight, which tends to get lost in the metaphysical extravagance. The 
three key elements of this conception of history are that history is (i) a 
process of development (ii) striving for some sort of perfection such that 
(iii) the process is irreversible. This substitutes for Hegel’s imposs ible 
metaphysics concepts open to ordinary philosophical analysis. I shall 
presently embark on such an analysis, but shall first briefly look at Dan-
to’s two different views on how history is involved in the essence of art. 
I think Danto misinterprets Hegel, but his ideas merit consideration on 
their own right. 
In The Transfiguration of the Commonplace, Danto argues that after 
Duchamp and Warhol there need not be any discernible difference be-
tween a work of art and a “mere thing,” and he suggests that “[a]rt is the 
kind of thing that depends for its existence on theories” and to see some-
thing as art demands “an atmosphere of artistic theory, a knowledge of 
the history of art.”50 
Danto’s clever illustrations, real and imaginary, raise the question 
whether the alleged theory-dependence is true of all art or only of what 
Danto later calls post-historical art, that is, Western art of the past hun-
dred years or so. If we look at earlier art, we hardly need theory to tell 
works of art apart from “mere things,” as there are no mere things faintly 
resembling any pre-20th century work of art. Danto would naturally re-
ply that it requires something like theory to see and in particular appreci-
ate even Mona Lisa as a work of art. That is undoubtedly so, but the same 
surely holds true for many other things as well. An atmosphere of theory 
is needed to see, say, the moon as a secondary planet orbiting around 
the earth. It would be even easier to find examples from the sphere of 
religion. It requires an atmosphere of doctrine and history to distinguish 
between the same wine in a bottle and in a communion chalice.51 This is 
not intended as criticism, as Danto nowhere claims that art is the only 
theory-dependent phenomenon, but it certainly raises the question of 
how art is to be distinguished from the many other theory-dependent 
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phenomena.52 In so far as the history of art is part of the atmosphere 
of theory, or the art world, which appears to serve the same function in 
some of Danto’s formulations,53 it is in some sense constitutive of art, but 
not in any such way as would provide specific answers to my questions 
of how art has its history and what kind of a history it is.
 Danto’s late Hegel-inspired view on the history of art, stated in After 
the End of Art, assigns history a very specific role, but claims at the same 
time that history is not constitutive of (the essence of) art. Art “reveals 
itself through history,” but is only “historically indexed” in the sense that 
history decides the extension of the concept, that is, what art there is 
in the world.54 It is the revelatory mission of history that distinguishes 
Danto’s view from a trivial truth. History regarded as a mere sequence 
of events could not be assigned such a mission. Art can have its history 
that way only if it is a history of a certain type. Basically, it needs to be 
a Hegelian kind of history as a process of development. However, the 
notion of an end is built into Danto’s account in such a manner that if 
we remove the supposed end (in the two sense of the word), the whole 
account loses much of its appeal. If I understand him correctly, Danto 
is saying that the goal of the history of art is for art to come to know its 
own nature and when that happened, the history reached its end point. 
Danto appears to think that once the history of art has run its course, it 
loses its philosophical interest and we are left with the contingencies of 
history, which are no longer philosophically interesting. The revelation 
of history cannot be that art is, as Hegel suggests, embodied meaning,55 
which, as I have pointed out, does not suffice to distinguish art from 
many other cultural products. It must be that art has, through its history, 
become aware that there are no pre-established constraints on how art 
can embody meaning. Art need not express divine truths, nor be beauti-
ful, harmonious and so on. This is a very interesting way of looking at 
the development of European art over the past hundred years or so, but 
with the possible exception of that short stretch in the history of art, it 
surely does not remove history from the essence of art. Even if Danto’s 
“post-historical” art were in some sense ahistorical, I fail to see how that 
by it itself would lift all art out of its history.56 How else could we recog-
nise post-historical art except with reference to historical art, and that is 
surely a matter of an internal relation. I think Danto misses Hegel’s key 
insight that all historical understanding, including that of history itself, 
essentially has a history. For my part, I fully subscribe to the Hegelian 




History of art as history of development
All earliest histories, including histories of art, are records or chronicles, 
chronological accounts of events, actions, objects, whatever. In its sim-
plest form a chronicle organises its contents through the external rela-
tion of temporal succession – B succeeds A, C succeeds B, and so on. We 
are not satisfied with mere chronicles because we expect from history 
insights into why and how something came about.57 This requires that 
the elements of a history be related in addition to temporal succession, 
by other types of external and internal relations. In the history of art B 
can be caused by A, C can be consciously influenced by B, D can be a vari-
ation of C, E can be intended as a tragedy and thereby refers to certain 
other works and so on. The connections can then constitute parallels, 
contrasts, continuities, transitions, variations, ruptures, erasures and so 
on. Establishing such connections puts an interpretation on the elements 
of the history. The idea of development is in some measure inherent in 
this way of looking at history, but certainly not in a specifically Hegelian 
sense. There need not be any one overriding line of development and de-
velopment as such requires no teleology of ends (in the two senses of the 
word). A line or process of development may just come to an end without 
reaching some preconceived end. Indeed, the very idea of history having 
preconceived ends makes sense only if we say, in a Kantian spirit, that 
we put those ends into the history in order to make sense of whatever 
the history is about.58 It makes no essential difference that, as Hegel in 
his complex manner says, we are here dealing with history essentially 
dependent on human intentions, actions and their products. It does not 
follow from the fact that the actors of a history act intentionally that they 
are motivated by a common preconceived goal.   
The idea that art would have its history as a process of development is 
virtually empty unless it is said in regard of what art is supposed to de-
velop. Hegel understood this well and gave content to (made concrete, as 
Hegel himself would have said) the extravagant philosophical develop-
ment history of the Spirit through a development history of “art forms” 
(Kunstformen). For Hegel historical development was intelligible only if 
it was trained on perfection. Hegel-inspired art history in a way natural-
ized Hegel by replacing the notion of art form as manifestation of the 
Spirit with the cultural concept of style. To be sure, the idea of progress 
lingered and perhaps still lingers in the histories told by art historians, 
but the concept of style as such entails no Hegelian ascension, let alone 
one with an end point. Indeed the development of style became the main 
problem to be solved in art history.59 It seems to me that the answer to 
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the question of how art has its history can only be that art has its history 
by way of a certain type of history, and I see no serious alternative to 
it being in a general way a history of development. This is the general 
answer to the two questions I raised above (p. 54). 
I have made a start on describing development in very general and 
non-teleological terms and thereby taking distance to the Hegelian view 
of progress that has had such a powerful influence on our thinking about 
human history in all its reaches. The art historians naturalized Hegel 
in substituting human mind for the Spirit. Still their histories have a 
flavour of inevitability. Wölfflin for instance sketches a rather grandiose 
internal history of art as history of the human vision, or the imaginative 
faculty. He suggests that history can be captured in art by means of five 
pairs of contrastive, internal stylistic concepts, such as linear-painterly 
and tactile-visual. 
The details of Wölfflin’s scheme are not important here, but he has two 
interesting ideas about the history of art as a whole. First of all, he thinks 
development, along the axes of his contrastive concepts, say from the 
linear to the painterly, has some sort of internal psychological and sty-
listic necessity about it and therefore runs “in one direction.”60 Leaving 
aside old-fashioned philosophical psychology, the idea is that history as 
a history of development is unidirectional not just in the trivial sense of 
temporal succession but for some internal reasons.   
Wölfflin’s second notable holistic idea is that the history of art consists 
in repeated development from what he calls classic art to baroque art. 
However, the development is not cyclical, but spiral, with every point of 
“recommencement” marking some sort of regeneration. Instead of think-
ing of the spirals of development constituting, in a Hegelian way, a con-
tinuous totality of history, we could simply regard them as self-contained 
stretches of historical development. More generally, as there is no reason 
to believe that the development of art would be governed by any uni-
versal laws of development of the kind proposed by Wölfflin and other 
Hegelian historians of art, we can say that the history of art can be told 
in innumerable more or less self-contained histories of development. 
What Wölfflin proposes as (universal) laws of development can best be 
regarded as aspects with respect to which development is traced.61 
We now have three defining characteristics of histories of develop-
ment. Such histories are (a) unidirectional, (b) irreversible and (c) trace 
development under some aspect(s) of development. To remove any idea 
of superhuman agencies operating in art and its history, we need an ad-
ditional condition stating that the relevant aspect(s) of development be 
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such that (d) bringing about changes with regard to such aspect(s) is 
under the artist’s control. I think Hegel would not have objected to this 
condition. However much the history of art may be history of the Spirit, 
it is the intentional activity of the artists that brings art into the world. 
I believe these four characteristics together essentially constitute the 
continuity and unity of histories of development. They distinguish such 
histories from mere chronologies. With this conception of history in hand 
we can lay to rest Hegel’s and Danto’s ideas of the end of history (in the two 
senses of the word), the idea that there is some one true history of art, but 
also Wollheim’s claim that histories told in terms of what he calls concepts 
of general style lack explanatory value. To be sure, there is much going 
under the name of history that lacks explanatory value, but the reason is 
not that the histories are told by means of some general style concepts, but 
that they lack a proper aspect or aspects of development. Period histories 
dividing time into centuries or decades generally lack explanatory value, 
because no unit of time is as such an aspect of development. 
There are no hard facts in either in the minds of the artists, or in their 
works, or in their contemporary cultural environment that would de-
termine under which aspect(s) of development a history must be told. 
But that does not entail that the choice of the aspect(s) is arbitrary and 
reflects “contemporary concerns” only. It is in the competence of the his-
torian to discover which aspects of development can best enable us to 
understand why art has developed the way it has. We can talk of discov-
ery rather than invention or fancy because histories are open to criticism 
and even refutation. 
I believe the four characteristics (a)–(d) are jointly sufficient to sep-
arate development histories from accounts of other kinds. I also believe 
they are at the core of the historicity of art, but before moving to that 
concluding issue I shall put some flesh on the bare bones of (a)–(d) by 
way of a few concrete illustrations and some philosophical reflections on 
why histories of this type essentially help us understand art.
Continuity and unity of history
 If art has its history as a history of development, then art does not sim-
ply happen, but comes about through complex processes of changes that 
unfold under some aspect(s) of development and are, moreover, irrevers-
ible. The history of art as this kind of internal development history is 
unidirectional. It is tempting to think, as Hegel and Danto do, that a pro-
cess that runs in one direction has an end in either of the two senses of 
the word, but this does by no means follow from mere unidirectionality. 
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Wollheim makes an important additional point about the “historical di-
mension” of art, as he puts it. Art is historically considered asymmetrical 
with respect to its makers and its recipients. At any given time, past art is 
available to the audiences of art, but not in the same sense to the artists.62 
And it is not just that it is not open to the artists to remake an earlier 
work, except by way of an ironical comment, but it is not open to her to 
recreate an earlier kind or style of art either.63
It is not at all obvious why the history of art should be unidirectional 
in this way. Instead of thinking about the matter in the abstract, it may 
be helpful to proceed in a Hegelian spirit and take a closer look at a par-
ticular developmental history. Ernst Gombrich has related the history of 
realistic pictorial representation in the West as a history of “making and 
matching” progressing through cumulative mastery of the means of rep-
resentation at the artist’s disposal.64 Then, in the same way as, say, in tech-
nology, the later would represent progress on the earlier in some respect, 
and going back would make no sense. I doubt that this is the right way 
of looking even at this particular stretch of history, and it certainly is not 
the right way of looking at the history of art at large. The development 
of art is not in a general way trained on greater technical competence 
and efficiency.65 However, this is only the making part of Gombrich’s for-
mula. Matching brings in the spectator. Although Gombrich stresses that 
matching is first and foremost a matter of learning to see reality through 
the picture, he maintains that the end of the development processes in 
the two senses of “end” is perfect pictorial illusion. It is a recurring theme 
in philosophical thinking about pictures and representation in general,66 
but illusion as an end is nevertheless illusory in that a perfectly illusory 
picture would cease to be a picture for the spectator and could not be 
judged as a work of art.
Pursuit of greater realism in some broad sense of the slippery word 
could perhaps explain the unidirectionality of some stretches of the his-
tories of some of the arts.67 But such stretches mark a very limited portion 
of the history of art and could not possibly give a general explanation of 
unidirectionality. Moreover, if we look at art in a broader historical and 
cultural perspective the very idea of development becomes somewhat 
problematic. For example Persian miniature painting has a history of 
schools and traditions, but perhaps no clear developmental history. To 
be sure, there are strands of stylistic influence and variation, but they do 
not necessarily add up to even stretches of irreversible, unidirectional 
stylistic development under some aspect(s) of development. But then 
there is no general reason why art should in all its reaches undergo con-
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stant development. Art can stand still and there can be interesting non-
historical things to be said about, say, the technical mastery of the artists. 
However, if art stood still for good, then it would truly come to an end, as 
it perhaps has come in Chinese calligraphy, or came in official Soviet art. 
Some histories of art have an end point, but there is no reason to believe 
that that would be true of art in general. 
The histories of art are many and varied. It can for instance happen 
that development under an aspect is picked up after a break. I would say 
that the two stretches of development constitute one discontinuous but 
internally irreversible history if the later stretch refers to the earlier one 
in a relevant sense.68 Hegel thought that art had lost its vigour in becom-
ing overly self-conscious, but surely that is the general direction of cul-
tural development in the big picture of Hegel’s metaphysics. 
Woolly Romantic notions of creativity are apt to cloud rather than 
elucidate the fact, for such it appears to be, that art is essentially an arena 
of internal development. For all its shortcomings, Hegel’s insight on this 
point was hard-won. Hegel clearly thought that whatever parallels there 
may be between the aspects of development that give content to the in-
ternal history and the external circumstances of time, place and culture 
are contingent and only belong to the external history of art. The idea 
that there should be a regular and systematic connection between the in-
ternal development of a given stretch of art and contemporary Zeitgeist 
is doomed to be circular. This is foremost evinced in the Hegel-inspired 
idea of the “periodicity of the (internal) development of art” that crops 
up early in the history of art history.69 Romantic art, say, is Romantic be-
cause it was created in the Romantic era, and one signal feature of the era 
is that it gave rise to such art.70 Such double-entry bookkeeping unduly 
narrows down the space for historical discovery and, moreover, offers no 
new explanation for the irreversibility of history. 
We have seen that Hegel thought about human history in its various 
fields, including art, as a history of the growing self-consciousness of the 
Spirit. Naturalising Hegel, we could conjecture that, as a matter of em-
pirical fact, cultural development leads, as Bernard Williams suggests, 
towards increasingly reflective and reflexive consciousness of a shared 
past among people living under a given culture. According to Williams, 
This consciousness itself has become more reflexive and complex in the course 
of human development, above all with the introduction of literacy. All human 
beings live under culture; many live with an idea of their collective past; some 
live with the idea of such an idea.71
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In identifying certain systematic variations in cultural activities and 
their products as traditions and styles we are, according to Williams, at-
tributing to the people involved complex intentions which are, moreover, 
self-referential in the sense that “the intentions refer to the tradition, and 
at the same time it is the existence of such intentions that constitutes the 
tradition.”72 Spelled out for art, this means that the history of art is irre-
versible because it is part of increasingly reflexive and complex thinking 
about shared cultural past.73 This suggests, correctly I think, that it is not 
reasonable to talk about art in a culture unless we can attribute to that 
culture some sort of consciousness of past time, historical or mythical. 
Therefore, it is very difficult, if not impossible to decide whether, say, 
rock and cave paintings are art. The paintings hint at stylistic traditions, 
but the evidence is so scanty and discontinuous that we can only guess at 
the sort of intentions that may have been involved in the production and 
reception of the paintings.74
My suggestion that the idea that the many histories of art – and the 
arts75 – constitute internal development histories receives support and 
substance from Williams’ reflections and in particular from the valuable 
insight that consciousness of a shared past is at the heart of culture. It is 
the job of the historian to trace the complex and reflexive intentions con-
stitutive of the traditions and styles. The question for the philosopher of 
art is how understanding the historicity of art, in the sort of general man-
ner that I have been developing, figures in understanding what art is. It 
is a large question and I shall confine myself to a few analytical remarks 
by way of summing up the view that I have been developing here.
Historicity of art summed up
I have claimed all along that art is essentially historical. Danto praises 
Hegel for grasping the complexities of art, “since unlike most philos-
ophers he had an historical rather than externalist view of the subject.”76 
I fully subscribe to that, but have opposed Danto’s interpretation of He-
gel that makes history a mere ladder revealing, at its end, the ahistorical, 
timeless essence of art. Whatever such an essence may be, it cannot, as 
I see it, be grasped in a Hegelian way past the historical particularity of 
the works, or instances of art. 
I have argued that it essentially belongs to art that it has its history (or 
rather, histories) as a certain type of developmental history that is (a) in-
ternally unidirectional, (b) irreversible, and (c) traces change under some 
changeable aspect(s) such that (d) the aspect(s) is (are) under the artist’s 
control. I suggest, then, that something, w, is art only if
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(i) w belongs to a history, h, that satisfies the above condition (a)–(d), 
(ii)  and w needs to be understood and appreciated in the light of h.
In this formulation the variable h rangers over particular histories that 
satisfy conditions (a)–(d). It places no other constraint on what can be a 
history of art.
As long as the history is internal, that is, its elements are internally 
related under some aspect of development, we as philosophers of art can 
trust the historian to take care of the discovery of such connections and 
the construction of a history out of them. 
As far as essence is concerned, the import of (i) and (ii) is that the es-
sence of art is neither (purely) ahistorical, as Danto appears to claim, nor 
historically relative, as the historicists claim.77 I fully appreciate that the 
two conditions turn on the normative presupposition that there are right 
and wrong ways of understanding works of art. No adequate defence of 
it is possible here, but whatever out-and-out relativists may say, it seems 
to me incontrovertible that art focuses on intentional activity, and it is 
fundamentally wrong to hold that human actions and their results can be 
ascribed to and interpreted in light of whatever intentions one fancies.78
I propose (i) and (ii) as necessary conditions for something being (an 
instance of) art. I am by no means claiming that these conditions exhaust 
the necessary condition of art as we know it. I see no objections to for 
instance Danto’s conditions of aboutness and embodiment, as long as 
they are not asserted as a way of lifting art out of its history, which in my 
view Danto is doing. It would be only too easy to invent counterexamples 
to show that (i) and (ii) are not sufficient conditions. The same holds for 
Danto’s proposed definition and indeed any definition of art I can think 
of. I also think Hegel and Williams have the explanation for this insuf-
ficiency. As a historical and cultural activity art becomes increasingly 
self-conscious and reflexive in a way that is essentially involved in the 
making and understanding of art. If that is so, it will not be possible to 
distinguish art from other cultural activities and their products without 
certain reference to art itself. As I see it, this circularity is not vitiating 
as such.79 On the contrary, it seems to me that it makes little sense to 
speculate about art philosophically beyond the pale of history and cul-
ture. Plato and his followers would disagree, but then I can see no way of 
understanding their position save historically. One limit of philosophy 
in this area is marked by the question of the possible biological, psycho-
logical and social origins of art. It is primarily a question for empiri-
cal research and theory, but I am by no means advocating philosophers’ 
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traditional complaisance towards empirical research. It is to a significant 
extent a conceptual, philosophical rather than purely empirical question 
whether a hypothesis concerning supposed pre-historical human behav-
iour and its products could reasonably apply to and account for art as we 
know it.80 As Kant put it, conception without perception is empty, and 
perception without conception is blind.
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31. In elucidating the concept of genius (creative artist) Kant slips into an en-
tirely different view, suggesting that unlike science, which is inferior to art on 
the point of creativity, “art somewhere comes to a halt, because a limit is set for 
it beyond which it cannot go, which presumably has also long ago been reached 
an cannot be extended any more” (Immanuel Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft, second 
edition, Werke in zwölf Bänden, herausgegeben von Wilhelm Weischedel [Wies-
baden: Insel Verlag, 1957/1793], § 74, 185; Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power 
of Judgment, trans. Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews [Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2000], 188.) This end-of-art view is clearly incompatible with and 
in no way entailed by Kant’s definition of genius, as Paul Guyer well argues (Paul 
Guyer, Kant and the Experience of Freedom: Essays on Aesthetics and Morality 
[Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993], 298–9). For more on the view of 
history suggested by Kant’s theory of art, see note 62 below.
32. The idea of cognitive stock as a way of separating work and context runs 
through Wollheim’s work. The most extensive discussion is in Wollheim, Paint-
ing as an Art, 89–96.
33. On the use of the camera obscura in 16th and 17th century painting, see 
Jean-Luc Delsaut, “The Camera Obscura and Painting in the Sixteenth and Seven-
teenth Centuries,” in Vermeer Studies. Studies in the History of Art 55, Center for 
Advanced Studies in the Visual Arts, Symposium Papers XXXIII, ed. Ivan Gaskell 
and Michiel Jonker (Washington: National Gallery of Art, 1998). Melanie E. Gif-
ford, “Painting Light: Recent Observations on Vermeer’s Technique,” in Vermeer 
Studies: Studies in the History of Art, eds. Ivan Gaskell and Michiel Jonkers (Yale 
University Press, 1998) gives an excellent technical analysis of Vermeer’s method 
of painting light.
34. Wollheim, Painting as an Art, 91–2.
35. According to Wollheim, “in the present state of knowledge, it must be a mat-
ter of speculation precisely how [individual style] is stored in the mind” (ibid., 26).
36. I prefer to translate “Bestimmung” neutrally as “determination” rather than 
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“vocation,” as Knox does. Hegel of course thought art was one of the three forms 
of the absolute spirit (religion and philosophy being the other two), and absolute 
spirit did by its very nature strive for absolute self-consciousness, or the abso-
lute idea, but it is essential to Hegel’s thinking that there are different levels to 
the spirit’s self-consciousness. It seems to me that the mission of art (religion 
and philosophy) is one and the same from the outset and in the quoted passage 
“(höchste) Bestimmung” refers to the highest level in the accomplishment of that 
mission rather than some different kind of mission.
37. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Äesthetik, Werke 13, 25.
38. I wish to thank the anonymous reviewer of the article for querying an in-
felicitous formulation suggesting that art had in Hegel’s opinion “run its course” 
long before his time. The decline of art in Romantic art, which found the task of 
suiting finite form to the infinite content of Christianity impossible, is of course 
an essential part of Hegel’s conception of the historical development of art. 
39. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Äesthetik, Werke 13, 24; Hegel, Aesthetics: Lec-
tures on Fine Art, 10.
40. Danto, The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art, 81.
41. The limitation of art is that it is bound up with sensuous media and cannot 
therefore reach the purity of thought that is philosophy’s privilege. Hegel notes 
that this limitation is also a strength of art (and religion) in that in them “the 
Absolute Idea is present for non-philosophical people, creatures of feeling, per-
ception, pictorial thinking” (Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Introduction to the 
Lectures on the History of Philosophy, trans. T. M. Knox and A.V. Miller [Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1985/1820], 28). From a Hegelian point of view, Danto’s view 
that art has turned into philosophy would also mean the end of (the history of) 
philosophy. Post-historical philosophy would then presumably be as free as art 
became after the alleged end of its history to do whatever it fancied. That would 
be one way of seeing some recent philosophy, but certainly not Danto’s, which 
remains as vigorously analytical and argumentative as ever and I do not think 
Danto would like us to treat it in any other way. Be that as it may, in his recent 
book Unnatural Wonders, Danto states in no uncertain terms that art “had turned 
into philosophy through the 1960s and into the next decade” (Arthur C. Danto, 
Unnatural Wonders: Essays from the Gap Between Art and Life [New York: Farar, 
Straus and Giroux, 2005], 14). I wish to thank Simo Säätelä for clarification of 
Danto’s position on this issue.
42. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Äesthetik, Werke 13, 26. I part company with Knox 
in translating “wieder hervorzurufen” as “calling forth anew” to make clear that, as 
I read him, Hegel is not saying that art no longer invites us to create new art.
43. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Äesthetik, Werke 13, 141; Hegel, Aesthetics: Lec-
tures on Fine Art, 102–3.
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44. I discuss this issue at some length in Pitkänen, “The End of Art, the Begin-
ning of Aesthetics,” 221–8.
45. See the remarks and the reference at the end of note 9 above.
46. One root of this idea of perfectibility is the Aristotelian idea of entelechy 
as the condition in which the essence of a thing is fully actualised. The idea of 
history as a process of realisation is pivotal to Hegel, who takes it for granted 
that only humans can have this kind of history because unlike “merely natural 
objects,” we have “a real capacity for change, and that for the better – an impulse 
of perfectibility” (Hegel, The Philosophy of History, 54).
47. The problem with Kant’s suggestion that art has “a limit is set for it” (Kant, 
Kritik der Urteilskraft, § 47, 185) is precisely that as it indicates no respect in 
which art would progress towards the alleged limit, the very idea of the limit is 
vacuous. See note 26 above. 
48. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Äesthetik, 25; Hegel, Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine 
Art, 11.
49. E.g. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Äesthetik, Werke 
14 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1970/1842b), 136–41.
50. Arthur C. Danto, The Transfiguration of the Commonplace (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981), 135.
51. I lack the theological expertise on the doctrine of transubstantiation to under-
stand the anonymous reviewer’s comment that the parallel between the transform-
ation of a mere thing to a work of art and the transformation of ordinary wine to 
Christ’s blood in the communion chalice only makes sense to Protestants, but not 
to Catholics. 
52. I construe and discuss at some length a counterexample to Danto’s defini-
tion of art in Pitkänen, “The End of Art, the Beginning of Aesthetics,” 231–7.
53. In the earliest formulation of his view Danto suggests that art belongs to a 
special world, the art world (Arthur C. Danto, “The Artworld,” The Journal of Phil-
osophy 61 (1965): 571–584). That he is using the word in a loose and metaphorical 
sense is confirmed by the fact that he firmly dissociates himself from the idea of 
the art world as an actual institutional world that serves as the basis of George 
Dickie’s institutional theory of art (Danto, The Transfiguration of the Commonplace, 
viii). (George Dickie, “Defining ‘Art’,” The American Philosophical Quarterly 6 (1969): 
253–6 is the first statement of his theory.) 
54. Arthur C. Danto, After the End of Art: Contemporary Art and the Pale of His-
tory (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 196.
55. Ibid., 195.
56. Pitkänen, “The End of Art, the Beginning of Aesthetics,” 225–8.
57. Hegel faults “the science of art” for “only busying itself with actual works 
of art from the outside, arranging them into a history of art” (Hegel, Vorlesungen 
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über die Äesthetik, Werke 13, 29; Hegel, Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art, 14). In 
other words, the fault of such a history is that it is an external history based on 
the external circumstances of art.
58. History of art is a very interesting area of history from a Kantian point 
of view. According to Kant, (fine) art owes its origins to (human) nature in that 
genius as the productive faculty of the artist “belongs to nature” (Kant, Kritik 
der Urteilskraft, § 46, 181; Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, 186). In the 
Critique of the Power of Judgment, his most extensive treatment of the topic of 
teleology, Kant stresses over and over again that we are not justified in ascribing 
objective ends to nature; when we talk about ends, we are talking about our sub-
jective needs to assume ends to make sense of phenomena (e.g. Kant, Kritik der 
Urteilskraft, § 61). As we lack a concept (rule) for the working of the artist’s genius, 
history of art as history of genius cannot be much more than a chronology. In the 
one extensive study of Kant’s theory of art Salim Kemal solves the problem by 
ignoring it and substituting Kant’s general views on culture, history and moral 
improvement for what Kant says in the Critique of the Power of Judgement. See 
e.g. Salim Kemal, Kant and the Fine Art: An Essay on Kant and the Philosophy of 
Fine Art and Culture (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 79–84.
59. The subtitle of Wölfflin’s classical treatise is The Problem of the Development 
of Style in Later Art.
60. Wölfflin, Principles of Art History, 227.
61. While admitting that there is no a priori reason to assume that the concepts 
he employs to analyse the alleged cycles of development in “later art,” that is, art 
on its way from the classical to the baroque, apply to all art at all times, Wölfflin 
suggests they could well prove universal (Wölfflin, Principles of Art History, Preface 
to the sixth edition, viii).
62. Richard Wollheim, “On the question ‘Why Painting is an Art’,” in Proceed-
ings of the 8th International Wittgenstein Symposium, Part 1, ed. Rudolf Haller 
(Vienna: Hölder-Pichler-Temsky, 1984), 102–4.
Wollheim talks about painting only, but by talking about painting as an art he 
certainly implies that similar accounts focusing on thematisation, intentions of 
the artist and her medium could be given for other arts. Wollheim talks of general 
aesthetics and “substantive aesthetics” for the different arts (Wollheim, Painting 
as an Art, 8). It is a remarkably Hegelian view of the scope of aesthetics.
63. For discussion of this point, see Pitkänen, “The End of Art, the Beginning 
of Aesthetics,” 211.
64. E. H. Gombrich, Art and Illusion: A Study in the Psychology of Pictorial Rep-
resentation (London: Phaidon, 1960).
65. The same goes for the idea that history of art is unidirectional and irrevers-
ible because it is a history of innovation and artistic revolution. Paul Guyer argues 
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that there is an unresolved tension in the view of the history of art implicit in 
Kant’s brief remarks on (fine) art. According to Kant, as a product of genius (cre-
ative artist) a work of fine art must at the same time be original and exemplary, 
that is, model to other artists. The requirement of exemplarity is designed to curb 
excessive originality in ruling out “original nonsense” (Kant, Kritik der Urteilsk-
raft, § 46 B 182). Guyer suggests that exemplarity evokes a stable canon of clas-
sics, while originality points to a history of continuous artistic revolution (Guyer, 
Kant and the Experience of Freedom: Essays on Aesthetics and Morality, 291–303). 
Looked at in a more neutral way, Kant’s two requirements for art provide for a 
curious mix of external and internal history. The originality of a work can only be 
judged against earlier art, but that is an external relation. Exemplarity could be 
an internal relation, with the example of an artist serving others “as a standard or 
rule for judging” (Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft, § 46, 182; Kant, Critique of the Pow-
er of Judgment, 187). This presumably means that the example of an earlier artist 
serves a later artist as a standard for judging the workings of his own genius, 
ruling out “original nonsense.” (For discussion of “original nonsense,” see Peter 
Lewis, “‘Original Nonsense’: Art and Genius in Kant’s Aesthetics,” in Kant and His 
Influence, ed. George MacDonald and Tony McWalter [Bristol: Thoemmes, 1990].) 
Kant’s elaboration of exemplarity gives the concept much more content. Accord-
ing to Kant, the ideas of the master “arouse similar ideas in his apprentice if na-
ture has equipped him with a similar proportion of mental powers” (Kant, Kritik 
der Urteilskraft, § 47, 185; Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, 188). One could 
see in this the rudiments of an internal history of art as history of influence. Kant 
thinks it is a mystery (of human nature presumably) how such influence comes 
about. If I understand him correctly, Kant is saying that influence is not a matter 
of copying, but something that takes place first and foremost in the mind of the 
apprentice whom the master’s work serves as “a model not for copying but for 
imitation.” The word “imitation” (Nachahmung) is confusing, but it seems to me 
that it essentially refers to the mind of the artist, while copying (Nachmachung) 
refers to the artist’s work (as activity and its outcome). A philosophical analysis 
of the concept of artistic influence would be a worthwhile enterprise and could 
not overlook Kant.
66. According to a tradition reported by Pliny the Elder, a competition for 
pictorial illusion was staged some 2500 years ago between the Greek painters 
Zeuxis and Parrhasius. Zeuxis’ painting of grapes lured birds to peck at them, 
but Parrhasius won the contest since his painting of a curtain induced Zeuxis 
to ask that the curtain be pulled aside. Zeuxis only fooled a dumb animal, while 
Parrhasius fooled a rational animal.




68. However, continuity is not established by all referring back. Postmodernist 
carnivalisation of Socialist Realism certainly refers back to what it carnivalises, but 
is in no sense a continuation of the history of Socialist Realism, as its aspect(s) of 
development is (are) entirely different. 
69. Wölfflin refers the idea of the periodicity of development to the history of 
architecture, as shaped by Burckhardt and Dehio, and regards it as self-evident 
that the history of “representative art” coincides with that of architecture in its 
periodicity (Wölfflin, Principles of Art History, 232). 
70. The grip of this way of thinking about history remains firm. Not so long ago 
we were told that the world had moved from the modern into the postmodern 
era lock, stock and barrel. 
71. Bernard Williams, “Making Sense of Humanity,” in Making Sense of Human-
ity and Other Philosophical Papers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1993), 80.
72. Ibid. 
73. On more Hegelian lines, Danto suggests that art cannot go back because art 
is always bound up with some way of life and there is no going back to an earlier 
way of life because we “cannot undo the history of mind, which has brought us to 
our present situation” (Danto, After the End of Art, 2–3). I take Danto to be talking 
about a collective history of mind, that is, of a cultural history. It is not immedi-
ately obvious why such a history should as such be unidirectional.
74. According to eminent rock paintings specialist David Lewis-Williams, rock 
paintings were produced in shamanistic cultures as vehicles or props for access 
to a spirit world (David Lewis-Williams, The Mind in the Cave: Consciousness and 
the Origins of Art [London: Thames & Hudson, 2002]). I would take issue with 
his claim that rock paintings mark the origins of art. They could at the very best 
mark the origins of picture making, and in view of the evident skill displayed, the 
surviving paintings could not possibly be the first pictures produced by Homo 
sapiens. The talk about the origins of art is confusing because I can see no reason 
to assume that there should be a common (evolutionary) explanation for why our 
ancestors became story-tellers, picture-makers, music-makers and so on.
75. The real histories of art are histories of the different arts, but I can see no 
general reason why any of those histories would not comply with what I have 
been saying about the history of art in general. 
76. Danto, After the End of Art, 194.
77. In my view Danto pays too high a price for his essentialism. The alleged 
ahistorical essence says next to nothing about any given individual work of art, 
giving free rein to historicism in their interpretation. Wollheim, for his part, 
takes art entirely out of history, leaving us with no explanation for its internal 
development either.
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78. One reason for the tension inherent in Kant’s theory of art (see note 62 
above) is that he thinks we could understand the work of the artist and its prod-
uct intentionally only if we could supply a determinate concept under which 
they would be intentional. This then leads to a rather schizophrenic division 
of the artist’s work into unaccountable invention (of aesthetic ideas) and inten-
tional crafting of the invention (Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft, § 48).
79. I would not wish to fault, say, Dickie’s institutional theory or Jerrold 
Levinson’s historical definition of art (Jerrold Levinson, “Defining Art Histori-
cally,” British Journal of Aesthetics 19 (1979): 232–250) in this connection for their 
more or less open circularity. As far as the history of art is concerned, the com-
mon fault of these theories is that they do not provide for the right kind of inter-
nal history of art. 
80. See note 7 above. Steven Mithen draws on an admirably broad range of 
empirical research in his recent account of the origins of music. Instead of specu-
lating about the origins of art in the abstract, Mithen sketches a history of how 
our ancestors began to sing and dance (Steven Mithen, The Singing Neanderdals: 
The Origins of Music, Language, Mind, and Body (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 2006)). 
Literature
Ameriks, Karl. Kant and the Historical Turn: Philosophy as Critical Interpreta-
tion. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006. 
Danto, Arthur C. After the End of Art: Contemporary Art and the Pale of History. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997.
Danto, Arthur C. “The Artworld.” The Journal of Philosophy 61 (1965): 571–584.
Danto, Arthur C. The Transfiguration of the Commonplace. Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1981.
Danto, Arthur C. The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art. New York: Colum-
bia University Press, 1986.
Danto, Arthur C. Unnatural Wonders: Essays from the Gap Between Art and Life. 
New York: Farar, Straus and Giroux, 2005.
Delsaut, Jean-Luc. “The Camera Obscura and Painting in the Sixteenth and 
Seventeenth Centuries.” In Vermeer Studies. Studies in the History of Art 55, 
Center for Advanced Studies in the Visual Arts, Symposium Papers XXXIII. 
Edited by Ivan Gaskell and Michiel Jonker. Washington: National Gallery of 
Art, 1998.
Dickie, George. “Defining ‘Art’.” The American Philosophical Quarterly 6 (1969): 
253–6.
Dissanayake, Ellen. Homo Aestheticus: Where Art Comes from and Why. Seattle: 
University of Washington Press, 1992.
Risto Pitkänen
78
Dutton, Denis. The Art Instinct: Beauty, Pleasure, and Human Evolution. New 
York: Bloomsbury Press, 2009.
Gifford, Melanie E. “Painting Light: Recent Observations on Vermeer’s Tech-
nique.” In Vermeer Studies. Studies in the History of Art. Edited by Ivan 
Gaskell and Michiel Jonkers. Yale University Press, 1998.
Gombrich, E. H. Art and Illusion: A Study in the Psychology of Pictorial Represen-
tation. London: Phaidon, 1960.
Guyer, Paul. Kant and the Experience of Freedom: Essays on Aesthetics and Mo-
rality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art by G. W. H. 
Hegel. Translated by T. M. Knox. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975.
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. Introduction to the Lectures on the History of 
Philosophy. Translated by T. M. Knox and A.V. Miller. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1985/1820. 
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. The Philosophy of History. Translated by J. 
Sibree. New York: Dover, 1956/1830.
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. Vorlesungen über die Äesthetik. Werke 13. 
Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1970/1842a .
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. Vorlesungen über die Äesthetik. Werke 14. 
Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1970/1842b.
Kant, Immanuel. Critique of the Power of Judgment. Translated by Paul Guyer 
and Eric Matthews. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
Kant, Immanuel. Kritik der Urteilskraft. Second edition. Werke in zwölf Bänden, 
herausgegeben von Wilhelm Weischedel. Wiesbaden: Insel Verlag, 1957/1793. 
Kemal, Salim. Kant and the Fine Art. An Essay on Kant and the Philosophy of Fine 
Art and Culture. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986.
Levinson, Jerrold. “Defining Art Historically.” British Journal of Aesthetics 19 
(1979): 232–250.
Lewis, Peter. “‘Original Nonsense’: Art and Genius in Kant’s Aesthetics.” In Kant 
and His Influence. Edited by George MacDonald and Tony McWalter. Bristol: 
Thoemmes, 1990.
Lewis-Williams, David. The Mind in the Cave: Consciousness and the Origins of 
Art. London: Thames & Hudson, 2002.
Mithen, Steven. The Singing Neanderdals: The Origins of Music, Language, Mind, 
and Body. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2006.
Nielsen, Kai. “Historicism.” In The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy. Second 
edition. Edited by Robert Audi. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999.
Pitkänen, Risto. “Immanuel Kantin Arvostelukyvyn kritiikki – erään klassikon 
ymmärrettävyyden rajat.” (Immanuel Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment 
Art and its History
79
– the bound of the comprehensibility of a classic.) In Aisthesis ja Poiesis. Edited 
by Arto Haapala and Jyrki Nummi. Helsinki: Helsinki University Department 
of Art Studies, 2000.
Pitkänen, Risto. “The End of Art, the Beginning of Aesthetics.” In Aesthetic 
Culture. Essays in honour of Yrjö Sepänmaa on his sixtieth birthday, 12 De-
cember 2005. Edited by Seppo Knuuttila, Erkki Sevänen and Risto Turunen. 
Helsinki: Maahenki, 2005.
Popper, K. R. The Open Society and Its Enemies. Vol. 2, The High Tide of Prophecy: 
Hegel, Marx and the Aftermath. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966/1947.
Williams, Bernard. “Making Sense of Humanity.” In Making Sense of Humanity 
and Other Philosophical Papers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1993.
Williams, Bernard. Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay on Genealogy. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2002.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Translated by D. F. Pears 
and B. F. McGuiness. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1921/1961.
Wölfflin, Heinrich. Principles of Art History: The Problem of the Development of 
Style in Later Art. Translated by M.D. Hottinger. New York: Dover, 1950/1915.
Wollheim, Richard. “On the question ‘Why Painting is an Art’.” In Proceedings of 
the 8th International Wittgenstein Symposium. Part 1. Edited by Rudolf Haller. 
Vienna: Hölder-Pichler-Temsky, 1984.
Wollheim, Richard. Painting as an Art. London: Thames and Hudson, 1987.
